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The economic history of the last half century offers two cases of serious international 
depressions in countries with an essential orientation towards a market economy: In the first 
half of the 1930ies and in the middle of the 1970ies. With some simplification one can say 
that in the former case recovery started after a few years without the aid of much conscious 
expansionist policy. An adaptation of the external values of the currencies took place in 
Northern Europe and in some British Dominions in 1931. It came almost two years later in 
the United States and in 1936 in Southern Europe. In the 1970ies, on the other hand, internal 
policy measures for expansion1 have been numerous and far-reaching in almost all 
industrial nations except some with weak balances of payments. They have been 
accompanied by numerous adaptations of foreign exchange rates to relative cost levels. Yet 
the recovery which started in 1975 and 1976 has not been more forceful – perhaps instead 
somewhat slower and more hesitant than in the earlier case - in spite of the more serious 
breakdown of large parts of the banking system in the 1930ies. The immediate impression of 
these facts is hardly favourable to a policy of expansion built on the macro-economic theory 
developed in the thirties chiefly at Cambridge and in Stockholm.2 But closer investigation 
and comparison is necessary. 
      The limited time at my disposal for this lecture makes it necessary for me to jump 
straight into a problem analysis, presenting some facts as I go along. Let me also mention 
that by the term “expansion” I mean a rising gross national product in monetary terms (GNP) 
and by contraction I mean the opposite. In some connections it will be clear that I have the 
net income - which does not include “depreciation allowances” - in mind. 
 
II. Keynesian and Stockholm Models For Expansion of Output and Employment. 
Among the theories which attempt an explanation of changes in employment and may be 
relevant for a comparison of recovery problems in the thirties and the seventies, I cannot 
pass over Keynes’ underemployment equilibrium ideas. 
_________ 
1 The fact that the expansive policy in 1976-77 proved insufficient to bring about the desired economic development 
does not justify to call this policy “restrictive”. 
2 Similar ideas were current also among Australian economists although with less support of basic theory. B. Ohlin 319
Keynes pointed out that-given a certain propensity to consume-an increase
in the volume of investment would bring about an increase in the national
income until it reaches a size which makes people willing to save an amount
equal to the value of the investment. The change in the national income is the
variable which had to reach a magnitude which is compatible with equality
between savings and investment. The conclusion was important. If the volume
of investment is increased the volume of employment would rise much more.
This was an abbreviated form of a reasoning that was included also in the
theory which the so-called Stockholm School built on the foundation of Wick-
sell’s cumulative process. But the Swedish theory took into account also the
indirect and endogeneous increase in investment which would be caused by
the expansion of the national income. And this secondary investment would
bring about a further growth of income and savings. Furthermore, in the paral-
lel work which took place in Stockholm while Keynes and his pupils worked
at Cambridge, we tried to give a concrete picture of the reactions of savings
by business firms and the public treasury, not only by individuals, thereby
presenting a more realistic account of the propensity to save which I as a rule
called “intention to save”.
1 I also tried to pay attention to the speed of reac-
tions between price and income changes for different groups of people in
processes of expansion and contraction, in order to find out something about
the effects that would be dependent on the order of events. Large commodity
stocks, e.g. of wheat, will intensity price reductions in the case of falling de-
mand. This would reduce incomes of farmers and merchants and their pur-
chases of other goods much quicker than the cost of bread purchases would
decline. Consumers would only slowly save money on cheaper bread and
increase their other purchases. This process took place in 1929 and exercised
a depressing influence on total demand.
Furthermore, the flexibility of prices and wages and the relation between
them would affect the development of profits which would play a role for the
process of expansion. All this was important for a study of the effects of policies
which aimed at increased employment and output with only small inflation.
Could an increase in investment bring about a rise in prices e.g. through an
upward pressure on wages rather than in the quantity output. Keynes’ answer
was in general in the negative. Contrary to many earlier assumptions he as a
rule assumed that, in cases where the unused supply of labour was large, the
flexibility upwards for wages was very small. Price flexibility in the beginning
of the recovery was assumed to be a little larger but still rather small. Hence,
an increase in aggregate demand early in a recovery phase would expand
output and employment. There would be almost no general wage increase but
some minor price increase. Profits would rise and investments might be further
stimulated, although this was not built into his basic equilibrium model.
1 See “Monetary Policy, Public Works, Subsidies and Tariffs as Remedies for Unem-
ployment”, (1934). -- An excellent survey of the scientific debate about Keynes’
theory is found in “On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes” by Axel
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The process outlined in Stockholm was not much different although more
attention was paid both to investment reactions and to the nature of expectations
concerning future prices for raw materials as well as finished products. But
there was on the whole agreement between the Keynesian group and the young
Stockholm economists that public investments financed by borrowing-in such
a manner that credits to business firms were not restricted but expanded if
necessary-would lead to a rise in production and employment without neces-
sarily much inflation as long as excess capacity was utilized.
Unfortunately, the conservatism of the British administration and a large
labour conflict in Sweden from early April 1933 until February 1934 prevented
an experiment on a large scale until a time when recovery was well under way
for other reasons. Then the restrictions on municipal expenditure in Sweden
in 1934 largely offset the expansive effect of the growing state financed invest-
ments.
An experiment on a much larger scale was carried out in Germany after
1933 under the leadership of Dr. Schacht and extensive central bank financing.
The result was a large increase in employment which continued several years
without much inflation. The administration checked wage increases and by
extended rationing measures weakened the price driving forces.
The 1970ies.
Let me compare these experiences with what happened in the seventies,
leaving some ups and downs of certain raw material prices aside. In most
industrial countries an expansive financial policy has been pursued in 1975-
77 under conditions of general expectations that price inflation would remain
strong. Wage demands and wage rates were substantially increased in the
beginning of the decade, oil prices were suddenly substantially raised towards
the end of 1973. Prices rose more or less in accordance with wages per unit
of output and the extra cost of oil and some raw materials. Production varied
with the business cycle but in some countries with only a faintly rising trend-
weaker than in the 1960ies. In some countries like Sweden cost levels were
too high-due to appreciation of the “krona” and substantially rising wages.
Hence the balance of trade from 1975 became weak and employment declined.
In several other countries a recovery started hesitatingly in 1975 but a set back
took place in the following year until some rise in output started again. All
the time unemployment remained on a high level and yet prices and costs of
living were rising, although with reduced force.
Evidently, some essential reasons for this unfavourable development can be
found in the high upward mobility of wages, in the unbalanced foreign exchan-
ge relations and in the general expectations of continued cost inflation, during
a period of expansive finance policies in most countries and expansive credit
policies in several countries through low levels of real rates of interest under
the influence of inflation which reduced the value of debts.
The early theories in the thirties were built on the assumptions of low wage
flexibility and moderate price expectations. This was realistic at that time but
had no contact with reality in the seventies. This explains why the so-calledB. Ohlin 321
Phillips’ curve is no longer relevant-as explained by professor Milton Fried-
man in the last year’s excellent Nobel lecture. Professor Friedman emphasized
the difference between an inflation which is expected-as in the seventies-and
one which is not foreseen when business firms make profit calculations for the
future. It took a long time before a general recognition of this fact found its
due place in the debate on employment policy.
I do not deny that the theory of expansion which was developed in Stock-
holm in the early thirties was deficient in not explaining clearly enough the
role of the different assumptions about the flexibility and speed of reactions of
wages, raw material prices and the prices of manufactured products and the
alternative possibilities of profit expectations. But more attention than in the
Keynesian model was given to these matters-and to the external balance.
The future cost-price relation may, of course, appear as unfavourable for
other reasons than rising labour costs per unit of output. Raw materials have
in several recovery periods been available only at rising prices, which may
cause risks for future losses.
It is also possible that a fall in the value of foreign currencies may cheapen
imported manufactured goods. This can mean unsatisfactory profit conditions
and, possibly, pessimistic profit expectations for the future.
I have chosen a few unbalanced price, cost and foreign exchange relations
to exemplify the obvious possibility that they may counteract tendencies to
expansion. Such unbalanced relations and consequent pessimistic expectations
were numerous in 1934 and 1935 in countries like France and Switzerland
which put off devaluation of their currencies until 1936, while most of the
other countries had devalued much earlier. Apart from brief periods after
the depreciation of the currency, e.g. in the United States in 1933,
there was no general expectation of a general rise of the price level nor were
wage costs going up or expected to do so in the near future, except in the
United States-particularly in 1933-34. As soon as sales volumes of export
goods started to grow under the stimulus of currency depreciation and the
cheapening of such goods on the world market-profits rose and the outlook
became more optimistic. This illustrates the great importance of the adapta-
tion of international cost relations and foreign exchange rates, a question I
shall return to. In the last few years there are other examples of a similar kind,
e.g. in France, which this time was quicker with a reasonable depreciation than
in the thirties.
So far I have said next to nothing about the great difference in interest
rates between the depressions in the early thirties and in the middle seventies.
Was the relatively greater force of the economic recovery in the former period
perhaps due to low interest level in the industrialized countries, whereas the
much higher interest level served as a break the recovery in the seventies?
In my opinion the answer is “No”. As a matter of fact, in spite of higher
nominal interest rates, it was cheaper to borrow capital in the seventies than
in the thirties. The influence of price level changes on the real value of the
sums one had to repay should be taken into account.322
From 1929 retail and wholesale prices were falling several years-longer
in the gold standard countries-and rising a few per cent in the following
period. Nominal bond yields in the leading countries-except Germany with
a level around 8 per cent-lay between 4 and 5 per cent-with a falling ten-
dency for some years. It is uncertain how much expectations of price level
changes influenced the borrowers’ opinion in the thirties about the “real”
interest they had to pay. The interest level was, in any case, positive not only
before 1933 but also in the following years. In the middle of the present dec-
ade, on the other hand, the rate of inflation and probably the expected price
rise in most countries exceeded the bond yield. Hence, “real” interest rates were
negative and remained negative or around zero to 1976 in most industrialized
countries, except Switzerland, where the inflation was insignificant. The
interest rate on middle term bank credit was higher everywhere and the
“real” level was often positive, but it does not much alter the picture. The
general impression is that in most industrialized countries borrowing was
cheaper in the seventies than in the thirties.
The “hesitant” character of the recovery in 1975-77 no doubt had more to
do with the restrictive credit policies in countries with “weak” payment balan-
ces, like Great Britain, Italy and Scandinavia-whereby the effects of an expan-
sive public finance policy was more or less offset-than with the “high” level
of interest charges. In countries with “strong” payment balances and general
confidence in the economic future, the interest policy did not deprive the
economic policy of its expansive character, e.g. in the United States and West
Germany where budget deficits were considerable, and a moderately expansive
policy of public expenditure was pursued. The net total effect of national eco-
nomic policy in weak and strong payment balance countries could be assumed
to be expansive.
The unfavourable factors include the monopoly price increase for oil and
the inability of the oil exporting countries to spend their new extra income.
Among the other circumstances which made profit expectations insufficient for
prosperity in the world economy one must reckon the rapid rise in labour
costs and the expectations that cost increase might outrun price increase, which
spread in business circles in many countries. This was one if the chief differen-
ces between the recovery periods in the 30ies and the 70ies.
Another difference was no doubt the fact that the percentage reduction in
world output and employment during the downward phase of the recession
was several times greater in the 1930ies than in the 1970ies. For this reason
surplus capacity when recovery started was greater-in percentage terms-in
the former period that in the latter. Without many “bottle necks” output
could grow more and the process of expansion could gather greater strength. On
the other hand, the relatively greater surplus capacity limited the stimulus to
new investment which may have weakened the forces making for recovery.B. Ohlin 323
III. The Relative Size of Inflation and of Production Growth When National
Income in Monetary Terms Is Expanded-under the Influesace of Different
Policies and Conditions.
How is a policy of expansion of GNP in value terms to lead to as much pro-
duction and as little inflation as possible? This is a question of great practical
importance. Some economists belonging to the monetarist school are inclined
to believe that a policy which raises the national income in terms of money-
starting from a position with considerable unemployment-will in most cases
bring much inflation and only a small increase of output. The opinion among
the expansionistic economists in the thirties was more optimistic. They believed
that it would be possible -- under the then existing conditions-to obtain a
large increase in output with only a little inflation. There is still a large group
of economists who hold an optimistic opinion, in spite of some gloomy recent
experiences.
My previous reasoning seems to point in the direction that a great many
circumstances will be able to influence the development, i.e. determine the
share of increase in GNP which takes the form of inflation and increased
production respectively. This seems to be a problem where-following Alfred
Marshall-one is justified in saying: “All brief statements are wrong”.
At which stage of the recovery will producers and traders in a certain in-
dustry start increasing their prices? My impression is that it will as a rule hap-
pen before the stage of full utilization of capacity is reached, but that rules
of behaviour vary from one country to another and change gradually. Much
depends on with utilization that is regarded as “normal” and what the market
outlook is for the near future. The influence of price control can be essential
as in Germany in the thirties, but small in other cases. If there is a general
expectation in the world that production in manufacturing industries will
expand, a speculative rise in raw material prices may come at an early stage
and lead immediately to somewhat higher prices for the finished products.
Expectations of this sort may lead to an increase in commodity stocks at all
stages of activity, which means an increased demand for primary products and
a further upward movement of their prices.
Evidently the behaviour of the world markets for primary products make
it much easier for an individual country to expand without inflation than it
is to bring about a world wide international recovery without inflation.
In general it can be said-with the abovementioned qualifications-that
the greater and the more evenly spread the surplus capacity is, the smaller
the inflation will be as a result of a certain expansion measure. Naturally, the
spread of unemployment among skilled workers, the wage policy of trade unions
and the possiblility of “wage sliding”, particularly in industries with piece
rate payment systems, will play a great role. It may also exercise a contagious
effect on wage rates in other industries.
The question I raised was the following: Which kind of policy of expansion
can lead to relatively large increase in output and employment and a relative-
ly small degree of inflation: It will be a political decision to determine what is
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nal “trade off” between one per cent more output and a certain per cent less
inflation at different stages of development. A number of policy aspects can
stimulate output and counteract inflation. They can change the optimum
position and can only be enumerated in this lecture.
1. The policy makers and the business world need knowledge about the
relevant conditions. It is not always easy, e.g. to get a true picture of the local
and inter-industry spread of surplus capacity with regard to labour and fac-
tories. If the facts in these respects are made generally known, it will help
industry to plan resource utilization e.g. increased supply of raw materials,
available when and where it is needed.
2. Stimulus to the private and public demand for the types of goods and
services which can be produced through a better utilization of the existing
capacity and available stocks of primary products and with the aid of new
capacity, which can be created within reasonable time. Public works fall under
this heading.
3. Counteract if possible disturbances in demand conditions which create
new and uneven surplus capacity.
4. Stimulate and facilitate movements of labour between places and regions
and between different occupations. Organise additional training for people
from all industries including agriculture, who want to qualify for new jobs.
Counteract a possible preference of some persons to live on social assistance
rather than seek a new job in new places or new occupations.
All these things and some others will facilitate an increase in output, as a
result of a selective increase in demand. With regard to the task of a weaken-
ning of the forces making for inflation I shall now mention some policy aspects
that can be essential.
5. Use strategic price control in some periods to counteract price increases
that go beyond the rise in costs and reasonable profits. This is particularly
important if monopolistic organisations will otherwise raise prices to obtain
profits that are generally regarded as unjust and bad to high wage claims.
6. Discourage tendencies to wage and salary increases which go beyond the
rise in costs of living and in productivity. (See section IV).
7. Attempt a general agreement between government, parliament and orga-
nisations that inflation should be kept back in accordance with a definite goal.
Lead in this way the price expectations away from anticipations of a contin-
ued inflation of the size of the preceding decade in industrialised market
economy countries.
8. Use a flexible monetary system which can reduce the value of foreign
currencies to counteract the effects of an inflation abroad if it is a natural part
of a policy to avoid deflation.
This kind of policy is naturally coordinated with the general policy of credit
and finance, which affects the aggregate volume of demand. The policy makers
have to make the “trade off” between the different possible combinations of
output and inflation. The goal is to find a “Pareto optinum”, where no possible
increase in output is worth the price of the consequent extra inflation and noB. Ohlin 325
possible reduction of inflation is worth the sacrifice of accepting the consequent
reduction of output.
The speed of the process of expansion of aggregate purchases, which is
called forth in this way will affect the character and durability of the develop-
ment. E.g. the adaptation of the supply of labour with regard to regional
location and quality will better correspond to the demand for labour if reasona-
ble time is available for the adjustment. This may be one reason why many
observers with practical experience from business hold the opinion that a
recovery will go further and that the high level of activity will last longer, if
the expansion is not speeded up excessively through measures to increase
aggregate demand. A cautious procedure also permits the gaining of insight
through “trial and error”.
The problem have here been seen from the point of view of an individual
country. Several extra difficulties and problems are created by the shifting
developments in different countries and their influence on international econo-
mic relations. See the last section of the lecture.
An analysis in equilibrium terms of the conditions of simultaneous internal
and external balances-a subject where a pioneer work has been done by
James Meade in “The Theory of International Economic Policy” (1951)--can
provide a helpful basic insight. Even though it is seldom directly applicable to
the study of a process of change in output and in price levels, it can give
indications as to which kind of such changes, that is a movement away from
the Pareto optium.
IV. Further Observations On the Increase of Real Income and the Limitation
of Inflation In a Phase of Expansion.
How is a continuation of an inflation of the magnitude which the industrialized
countries have experienced in the last decade to be avoided? My analysis
can be brief as there is a considerable agreement between economists about this
question, although the difficulties in making such policy effective in real cases
are great for social and political reasons. Insight in this matter is important
for successful policies which aim at an expansion of real income.
It is a generally accepted procedure to make a distinction between three
types of inflation. The first is “demand inflation” which occurs when the
aggregate demand exceeds the value of the aggregate supply at existing prices.
The sum total of consumers demand and investment demand coming from
domestic or foreign sources exceeds the value of the supply, which also has
its origin both at home and abroad. In other words, there is a lack of general
monetary balance. It is often caused by an increase in private investment
demand or demand for public purposes but can also be due to an expansion
of consumers’ purchases connected with a reduction in the disposition to save on
the part of individuals and business firms, as well as public authorities. A
characteristic of this kind of inflation is usually that the excess of demand
leads to increased business profits. Business incomes rise quicker than costs.
The second type of inflation can be called "cost and monopoly inflation”.
It is often due to the pressure of increased wage rates or new or higher wage326 Economic Sciences 1977
taxes. In these cases the cost of labour in production is moved upwards more
than productivity. In the absence of special obstacles, e.g. foreign competition,
the consequence is rising commodity prices but not rising profits. It occurs
sometimes that demand inflation is superimposed on cost inflation.
However, cost and monopoly inflation may also be caused by monopolistic
price increases at home or abroad. The leading instance is the lifting of the
price of oil to three or four times its former level a few years ago. The con-
sequence was higher costs throughout industries which need large quantities
of energy and higher commodity prices. If the credit systems of the different
countries should refuse to supply the means of payments and volumes of new
credit required for such a development - with the intention of preventing rise
of the price level-the result will be a growth of unemployment.
From the point of view of an individual country a third kind of inflation
is the upward pressure on costs and prices which can be the result of rising
prices abroad, unless this effect is prevented by a rise of the exchange rate
of the domestic currency.
It goes without saying that many difficulties meet a government which-
under present conditions-in cooperation with the central bank tries to avoid
demand inflation, control monopolistic pricing and create conditions where a
trade union pressure or so-called wage sliding does not lead to wage increases
which exceed the average growth of productivity. Besides, to avoid contagious
import inflation due to rising prices abroad-when they are rising -it is
necessary to use a system of flexible foreign exchange rates, which may be
complicated by speculative capital movements. It may, however, sometimes
be assisted by such movements, if a skilful policy of declarations of monetary
goals is used.
There can be no doubt that the greatest problem in the long run is how
to create the situation where excessive wage increases are avoided. In a country
like Sweden the share of the national income after deduction of taxes, which
goes to wage earners and salaried people is normally above 80 per cent. The
extra income which is due to monopolistic price policies of domestic business
firms is insignificant, except perhaps during boom periods. Foreign monopolies
have played a much greater role in the seventies than the private domestic
monopolies, most of which have to reckon with competition from abroad and,
therefore, are rather “single producers” than real monopolists.
Under the conditions created by high marginal income taxes and expecta-
tions of continued inflation trade unions in Sweden in the last three years
found it necessary to ask for-and obtained-wage increases which-including
wage sliding and increased wage taxes-increased the labour costs almost ten
times as much as the increase in real wages. A system which makes it necessary
to obtain a nominal wage increase of 15 per cent to give a reasonable chance
of an increase in real earnings by 2 per cent can hardly be called rational.
The centralised negotiations between employers and unions are under these
conditions chiefly concerned with the question: how much inflation Sweden is
to have. Only secondarily the issue is how large the increase in real earnings
shall be, but the answers to these two questions hang together. Consequently,B. Ohlin 327
the discussion has run in terms of very high nominal wage increases. This is so
in spite of the fact that the outcome with regard to real earnings during a one
or two year period after the agreement is uncertain as it depends on the un-
known future increase in costs of living.
Evidently-apart from the progressive tax system, heavier through inflation
-one of the main reasons for wage demands which are many times higher
than the rise in productivity is the expectation of continued large inflation.
Here we meet a great difference between the actual situation and the condi-
tions during the depression of the 1930ies. The experience of falling prices from
1929 to 1932 led to the belief that no large rise in the cost of living could be
expected in the first few years. This in turn led to what seems now very modest
wage demands, moderate price increases and low inflation in the following
years even in countries where depreciation had paved the way for recovery.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that if we are to combine a reasonably
high volume of employment with a greater stability of price levels in the
industrial world in the future than we have had in the seventies, some revision
of the method of collective agreements is called for-in some countries at
least. The trade union members are concerned with real earnings and not
earnings in terms of money. It should not be impossible to negotiate about
what the parties concerned are interested in. If this proves impossible, there
must be some kind of “income policy”, e.g. through agreement between govern-
ments, parliaments and labour market organizations. It can limit the nominal
wage increase without reducing labours’ dominating share of the real national
net income. A system of “index scales” of income taxerates will probably be
necessary.
Besides, it seems inevitable that some adaptation of the foreign exchange
rates must take place now and then, as labour costs, productivity and demand
conditions cannot be expected to follow the same lines in all industrial coun-
tries. The question also arises if the need of foreign exchange variations could
be reduced through some coordination of the relative changes of the wage
demands of the trade unions in different countries. But it is obvious that
enormous difficulties would meet such an attempt.’ When will time be ripe
for an attempt?
V. Brief Observations on the Results of Insufficient Adaptations of Internatio-
nal Cost Relations.
Let me begin with the influence of an adaptation of the foreign exchange
rates on the development of output in an early case. Finland avoided parti-
cipation in the world wide deflation in the beginning of the 1920-ies and
1 A very skilfully made survey of some problems which I have dealt with in this part of
the lecture is to be found in “Inflation and Unemployment” by Lars Calmfors and Erik
Lundberg, Stockholm 1974 (in Swedish). A more recent OECD-investigation “Towards
Full Employment and Price Stability” by seven leading economists from seven industrial
countries under the chairmanship of Paul McCracken, Paris 1977, -- the Swedish member
was Assar Lindbeck - also provides an excellent survey and analysis.328 Economic Sciences 1977
also suffered less than other North European countries through increased un-
employment and decline in industrial production. From 1920 to 1923-the
period of deflation in Scandinavia and Great Britain, which were close trade
partners of Finland-the Finnish cost of living rose by 22 per cent. The
quotation of the Finnish mark at the same time fell by 46 per cent. Finnish
wage costs were in the rest of the 1920ies relatively low compared to in most
European industrialised countries.
More important for my lecture is the influence of the depreciation of the
British and Scandinavian currencies in the autumn of 1931-by roughly 27 per
cent for the pound and a little over 30 per cent for the Scandinavian curren-
cies. The Italian lire followed a similar course. But the dollar was depreciated
by 40 per cent in the course of 1933 and the Scandinavian currencies slided
down to about the same relative position. while pound sterling was kept a
little higher in its relation to gold. The French and Swiss currencies were
kept stable in gold until the autumn of 1936, when they also were depreciated.
Without going into the differences with regard to the development of
relative wage costs-which differences were much smaller than the foreign
exchange variations-it is possible to draw some conclusions about the effects
of the changes in competitive power, which took place as between Great Britain
and Scandinavia, on the one hand, and France, on the other.
1929 100 123 100 115 100 115 100 125 100 168
1931 68 107 84 103 89 117 68 110 96 158
1933 64 94 88 98 77 107 61 96 91 151
1935 76 100 106 100 67 100 94 100 123 155
1937 92 105 124 108 83 128 117 101 149 161
Table I shows that the development of production in industry from 1931
to 1933 was more favourable for the depreciating countries, although Sweden
-where output was almost as high in 1931 as two years earlier-suffered
from a delayed recession and the special Kreuger crisis in 1932. The countries
with fixed gold value currencies saw their industrial output decline. In France
the drop from 1931 to 1935 was about 25 per cent, while the index for Great
Britain rose by 26 per cent and for Sweden by 28 per cent. In Germany the
enormous expansion of public activity chiefly for rearmament brought about
a large increase in output and employment, in spite of the high quotation of
the mark. Import restrictions were used to keep the foreign trade deficit
down.
The development in the United States was affected by a quite different
“economic policy program” from the summer of 1933 when the policy of the
Roosevelt regime got going. From 1929 to 1931 industrial production declined
by 32 per cent and by a further 6 per cent in the following two years. Then,B. Ohlin 329
in the first two-years periods, came an increase of output by 17 per cent and 21
per cent respectively. But these figures hide the fact that the volume index
rose from 63 in the first quarter of 1933 to 100 in July and then fell to 73 in
November. It remained on this low level for 13 months to November 1934.
Only thereafter did the lasting recovery start! This serious set back is a
problem in itself.
I must confine myself to some brief observations. The recovery program-
started in the first half of 1933-which aimed at higher wages-brought an
end to pessimistic price expectations in many circles, which stimulated produc-
tion. However, it became gradually more and more evident that to increase
the price of something you want to sell-in this case labour-was not an
effective means of stimulating the sales, i.e. the demand for labour and employ-
ment. A certain distrust of “government intervention on a large scale” persua-
ded important business circles to “wait and see”. If prices were expected to
rise as much as wage rates, expected profits would not go up, unless one could
be reasonable certain of an increased future volume of sales, which the business
world was not in the beginning. This I maintain is one of the main reasons
why the original optimism in many American business circles disappeared and
a set-back in production came.
There was, however, after some time a considerable stimulus to American
export industry from the increase of competitive power due to the devalua-
tion of the dollar and from improvement in business in some European and
other countries. The import competing home market industries also got a
better chance. Besides, some government measures to stimulate private build-
ing and large public works exercised positive effect on production. Under
such conditions the cheapening of credit and the reorganisation of the credit
system could assist also. However, the wrong method to increase demand for
labour, must have delayed and weakened the recovery. To what extent “time
was ripe” for an ordinary upswing of the business cycle-once the expectations
of continued price decline had vanished-is impossible to say without detailed
analysis of all possibly relevant facts.
Let me now turn to the 1970-ies and inquire if here, like in the 30-ies, one
can trace an influence of unbalanced relative cost relations in different coun-
tries due to maladjusted foreign exchange rates.
Like France and other gold standard countries in the years 1931-36 some
countries in the seventies kept the international quotations of their currencies
on too high levels. Internal cost developments were not sufficiently or only
belatedly taken into consideration. In other countries the devaluation was
excessive. The fall in the external value of the dollar, pound sterling and lira
brought difficulties e.g. for French industry, until a downward movement of
the quotation of the French franc in the middle of the decade helped to restore
the competitive ability of the French industry. The overvaluation of the
currency lasted longer in Sweden, where in the two years 1975 and 1976
labour costs rose by 42 per cent, while the external value of the Swedish330 Economic Sciences 1977
currency was raised by 8 per cent relative to the average quotation of the
currencies that were important for Swedish trade. The result was a growing
loss of markets for Swedish export industry and great difficulties for some
import competing domestic industries as well. Naturally, the changing structure
of the world economy, e.g. textiles, steel and wharfs also played a significant
role.
The failure to adapt the foreign exchange rates when internal costs rose
differently in different countries also brought some other indirect negative
effects for the world economy, which made themselves felt not only in coun-
tries with “overvalued” currencies, but also in countries with a long lasting
inflation, a falling external value of its currency and a “lack of confidence” i.e.
pessimistic expectations and a flight of capital. Profit expectations were
unsatisfactory in countries like Great Britain and Italy, although their
currencies were not “overvalued”.
The direct and indirect negative effect of overvalued currencies was well
known already in the 1930-ies. It was emphasized particularly by J. M. Keynes,
when Great Britain had returned to the old gold parity in 1925, without a
natural balance with costs in the chief competing countries. When finally the
pound was depreciated in 1931, Keynes reaction was optimistic. In a letter I
received a few days later he wrote: “We in Great Britain are living in a state
of boisterous cheerfulness over the events of the last week!” (24th sept 1931).
It may be worth while to add some brief comments on the Swedish econo-
mic development in the periods after the devaluation of its currency in the
early 1930-ies, the late 1940-ies and in the present year 1977. As I have already
mentioned, there was only a very insignificant expansionary economic policy
in the years 1932-1935, although much more had been planned. Some years
the contraction in the municipal financial policy offset the expansion of the
state. But, a rising demand for Swedish exports from the autumn of 1932 and
the relatively low Swedish costs after a depreciation around 40 per cent in the
years 1931-33 brought a substantial recovery in the Swedish economy, which
lasted until the second world war. Particularly for a small country, an under-
valued currency seems to have a very considerable expansionary effect-
particularly after a certain lapse of time.
This conclusion is corroborated by the Swerish development after the depre-
ciation of the “krona” by 30 per cent in 1949. Swedish costs became relatively
low and the competitive power remained large during many years thereafter, in
spite of substantial wage increases. A very favourable economic development
characterized Swedish industry in practically the whole of 1950-ies.
In the last few years, the opposite Swedish development, which I have indi-
cated for 1975-76, brought a larger labour cost increase than in most coun-
tries, which had the opposite effects on output and employment. They
stagnated and declined.
Competitive prices based on relatively low money costs in some countries
seem to exercise a favourable influence on industry in those countries but
probably a negative effect on other countries. This, however, depends a great
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The impression gained is no doubt that a better international cost balance
in the 1970-ies would have made the competitive power of different countries
more “normal”. It would also have increased confidence in business, dimin-
ished certain speculative capital movements and led to a more efficient conglo-
merate of measures for economic expansion. To avoid an “overvalued” curren-
cy is, evidently, not a sufficient condition for such profit expectations and
investment volumes, that are necessary for the maintenance of high employ-
ment. But the maladjustment of relative cost levels seems in many cases-both
in the 1930-ies and the 1970-ies-to have been one of the major causes of an
unfavourable development of employment.
The erratic development of relative production costs in different countries
and of the external currency values, could, of course, be modified so as to im-
prove the international cost balance and, reduce discrepancies in competitive
power. The International Monetary Fund or some other institution could
serve as an expert advisory agency with regard to minor depreciations and
appreciations of the currencies in the member countries. IMF-rules of be-
haviour with regard to the relation between cost level variations and foreign
exchange rates could be laid down in the same way as the codex of principles
for trade policy by the GATT. It is conceivable that thereby the conditions
for reasonable policies of expansion could be improved from a world econom-
ic point of view.
It should not be overlooked, however, that a natural depreciation of a
currency of a country with an excessive cost level will make international cost
relations during a considerable period of time more natural only if the price
raising effect of the depreciation does not lead to considerable extra labour
cost increases or an unfavourable development of productivity. If it does, infla-
tion will get new force and an international cost relation maladjustment will
continue.